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A NOTE ON CERTAINTY AND POLICY IN
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS: MAY WE
HAVE A CODE FOR THE NEW MONEY SERVICES?
Stephen M. Ege*
There is a good deal of legal work to be done in establishing a law of elec-
tronic funds transfers (EFT). Through the use of communications media-
principally telephone lines with terminals and data processing facilities at ei-
ther end-it is becoming possible to transmit and process financial informa-
tion on a scale and of a character heretofore unknown. Retail application
of these developments has been foreshadowed for at least the last decade and
a half through various experimental efforts by financial institutions and others
but is only now beginning to materialize on any significant scale.'
At the federal government level, the Department of the Treasury has begun
its direct deposit program under which social security and other government
payments are deposited directly into financial institutions using magnetic
tapes in place of paper checks. This program should be a major stimulant
to the development of electronic funds transfer services. The millions of pay-
ments that will be run through this system will have implications for
the development of hardware systems and procedures which will make elec-
tronic, nonpaper payment possible. 2 Similarly, the activities of Fedwire, an
in-place and operating electronic funds transfer system of major proportions
transferring trillions of dollars per year, have influenced systems and proce-
dures for electronic funds transfer developments and will continue to do so
in the future.3 In addition, bank run automated clearing houses (ACH's) are
* A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of Chicago. Member of the District of
Columbia Bar. Associate General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Board or its staff.
1. See G. SPOFFORD & R. GRANT, A HISTORY OF BANK CREDIT CARDS (Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, 1975).
2. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DIRECT DEPosrr OF FEDERAL RECURIuNG
PAYMENTS (Jan. 1975).
3. See Federal Reserve Operations in Payment Mechanisms: A Summary, 62 FED.
RES. BULL. 481 (1976).
Code for the New Money Services
beginning to process a significant volume of transactions, 4 currently number-
ing about a half-million per month. These systems process both government
and private payments. The story is a simple one: systems which work pro-
vide a model for those which follow.
Additionally, there are other private sector developments. For ex-
ample, the major bank credit card systems operate authorization systems on
a 24-hour a day, 7-day a week basis. Prior to a credit card purchase,
these systems ensure that an authorized party is using the card and that
a credit limit has not been exceeded. This is the credit side of the EFT
ledger. On the debit side, several concerns are operating check valida-
tion services. These services give the merchant an indication of the likeli-
hood that the check will be honored by the bank on which it is drawn at
the time the purchase is made. The check has become a less negotiable in-
strument in our metropolitan centers, and the check validation service
helps to make the check more acceptable to merchants-more negotiable, as
it were. Both of these validation systems are a part of the developing elec-
tronic funds transfer technology; that is, hardware systems and procedures
for handling money transactions. They are presently in place and operating
on a major scale.
In a development which may be even more significant than the issuance
of credit cards by banks in the 1960's,5 financial institutions are now begin-
ning to experiment with new user procedures which have come to be called
electronic funds transfer systems. These systems are in their infancy and are
of unproven utility. At this time, they are performing only one primary func-
tion: providing an additional type of equivalency between account balances
and cash for users.
At present, account balances at financial institutions serve at least two
functions. First, an account balance may serve as a vehicle for payment
transactions when used in conjunction with the check. The account balance
along with the paper check and institutional clearing arrangements amount to
a payment mechanism. Second, the account may be made liquid by trading
a balance for cash, a process which, until recent developments in technology,
could only be performed at the business location of the financial institution.
This is simply a technical way of describing deposits and withdrawals at the
teller's window.
There are other functions which account balances perform for users besides
the two described above. For example, the account balance, as a compensat-
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARINo HoUSE AssocuTioN, NACHA QUAR-
TERLY UPDATE (Apr. 1976).
5. See SPoPI~oRD & GRANT, supra note 1.
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ing balance, may be a prerequisite to the availability of a line of credit to
the accountholder. The systems and procedures which have been denomi-
nated electronic funds transfer services have given the account balance a
fourth major function: cash equivalency at points of cash use. Through the
use of terminals and accounting arrangements between merchants and finan-
cial institutions, cash may be taken in or disbursed by the merchant and
counted, respectively, as a deposit to or withdrawal from the account balance.
Machines may also provide these services, operating as sophisticated vending
machines. It is because of this deposit-withdrawal function at points of cash
use that the electronic funds transfer services are causing so great a stir, es-
pecially among competing financial institutions.
In one way these systems are not as revolutionary as they appear to be.
Even without electronic funds transfer services, a consumer may cash a check
at a retail establishment. This turns his account balance into the more
spendable cash commodity. Merchants may, of course, be reluctant to take
checks for fear that they may be dishonored. There is, however, no close
analogy to the deposit function; certainly funds cannot be deposited in an
account by simply endorsing a check over to the merchant. The check mere-
ly becomes the endorsee's,O and the customer gets cash or goods in return.
There are reasons why existing check payment practices provide an alter-
native to the withdrawal function but not to the deposit function. We may
view the check cashing function as a cash withdrawal system which piggy-
backs those accounting arrangements between merchants and financial insti-
tutions necessary to accomplish a withdrawal on the existing payment func-
tion system of check clearing. Check cashing has heretofore been viewed
as a hybrid payment transaction. However, check cashing may, with equal
facility, be viewed as a hybrid withdrawal transaction. A deposit system can-
not similarly be piggy-backed on the check payment system, however, since
there is no accounting relationship between merchants and financial institu-
tions whereby a credit to the customer's account at his or her financial insti-
tution and a debit to the merchant's account at its financial institution can
be accomplished. Check clearing is a withdrawal clearing network and not
a deposit clearing network or credit transfer network as it is sometimes
called. 7 If the United States had in place a giro or credit transfer network
as used in other parts of the world, the proper accounting relationships would
6. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(20), 3-202, 3-301.
7. Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, with its definition of banks in the
collection chain, assignment of responsibilities, and final payment, presupposes such a
debit culminating transfer network. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213, Com-
ment 1.
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exist to make deposits possible." Check clearing is like a wave that culmi-
nates in a withdrawal from the drawer's account; the giro system culminates
in a credit to the payee's account.
It is equally important to observe that our analysis of the functional simi-
larities between the new electronic funds transfer systems and that part of
the check system which provides for withdrawals through check cashing con-
fuses fundamental legal distinctions between a deposit or withdrawal on the
one side and check payment on the other. The check system is well gov-
erned by the law of negotiable instruments as well as by federal legislation
limiting money creation by banks through the imposition of fractional reserve
requirements.9 In contrast, the deposit-withdrawal functions have been left
to private agreement and to the general superintendence of the bank regula-
tory agencies; there is no Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) of deposits and
withdrawals, although fractional reserves are required even for accounts not
used in conjunction with checks. 10 On this analysis, the draftsmen of the UCC
committed a major blunder in titling article 4 "Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions." Fundamentally, article 4 deals with check collections alone. Only
in minor respects does article 4 reach the accountholder-financial institution
relationship apart from the check collection function." Problems of nomen-
clature aside, it seems clear that in fashioning rules for electronic funds trans-
fer transactions, the legal system may wish to consider distinguishing deposit
and withdrawal functions from payment functions.
There is only one private institution in the country12 that has taken the
step of substituting a terminal-based transaction for check payment-that is,
checkless payment at the point of sale. A plastic card is inserted into an
electronic terminal at a checkout counter, a button is pushed, and goods
are paid for without cash or check. The Treasury Department program is
a payment system on a grander scale; millions of recipients will be "paid"
by a direct deposit of their monthly benefits.
One more element of confusion may be added to the picture before turn-
ing to a discussion of the codification of these developments. Assume
a financial institution starts to offer the new deposit-withdrawal service
as well as a paperless payment service, but, for reasons of economy,
8. See G. DAvIEs, NAIONAL Gino, MODERN MONEY TRANSFER (1973); Baxter, The
Simple Payment of Money, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 63 (1974).
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
10. Reserve requirements apply both to demand and time deposits. Id.
11. An example might be the article 4 rule that a depository bank permitting a with-
drawal against uncollected funds is given a security interest in the item sent for collec-
tion. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-208.
12. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association, Glendale, California.
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decides to issue just one plastic card. This card would also serve as the famil-
iar credit card. Accountholders could make purchases either on credit or
by payment from their account balance. Under existing procedures, a pur-
chaser makes a similar choice when deciding whether to pay by check or
credit card. It can be argued, however, that a single card serving both func-
tions is not easily classified under current legal categories. For some pur-
poses at least, payment by the accountholder after the receipt of goods and
services will not be credit, while payment before receipt will, precisely the
reverse of one's expectations. 13 Even checks involve some degree of credit
since collection procedure necessarily involve delays, as checking account
customers are well aware. Moreover, a dishonored check creates a payment
obligation, although the procedure is regarded as an unorthodox manner of
creating a credit sale. Curiously, simple failure to make timely install-
ment credit payments is not accompanied by the severe sanctions, including
criminal liability, that are attached to writing a dishonored check. 14 Critical
points in contractual understandings and in accounting entries require iden-
tification in the new systems in order to serve payment and credit policies
and to fall within their associated legal structures. At all events, classifica-
tion difficulties demonstrate how the new systems and procedures are blurring
traditional distinctions in financial services. Electronic funds transfer sys-
tems can destroy the convenient emblems, both paper and plastic, which
distinguished previously established contractual and other legal relationships.
The developments which have been described, particularly the new service
developments called electronic funds transfer systems, have raised a number
of other troublesome issues. These include the money service powers of the
financial institutions establishing the new systems, the regulation vel non of
financial institutions as communications common carriers, the proper applica-
tion of antitrust constraints, and the collection and dissemination of high pow-
ered information, that is, of private information relating to financial transac-
tions.15
It is an interesting measure of the success of the UCC that few commenta-
tors on the subject of electronic funds transfers have questioned the need to
address these new systems in terms of their impact on that body of law, with
a view toward appropriate revision. In point of fact, a principal purpose of
13. Ege, Electronic Funds Transfer: A Survey of Problems and Prospects in 1975,
35 MD. L. REv. 3, 34-39 (1975).
14. See IA MIcHIE, BANKS AND BANKING §§ 75-79 (1973). See generally W. LA-
FAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 92 (1972).
15. See Ege, supra note 13.
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the Uniform Commercial Code was to introduce a contractual structure which
would take account of and incorporate existing commercial or business prac-
tices largely to the exclusion of other considerations. The Code vindicated
Lord Mansfield by enacting into positive law his willingness to consult the
commercial practices of his time when resolving commercial disputes.',
It may also be asserted that the legal task presented by developments in
the electronic funds transfer field is similar to that presented to the drafters
of the UCC. Certainly the body of rules contained in the Code, and espe-
cially articles 3 and 4 having to do with "Negotiable Instruments" and "Bank
Deposits and Collections," has been pressed into use to provide some legal
framework for these new transactions. However, as previously discussed, the
analogies to existing commercial practices and law are not as compelling as
they at first seem. Equally as important, there are significant differences be-
tween the codification effort which produced the Code and our present search
for the legal status of electronic funds transfer transactions.
The UCC was first and foremost a drive to add the element of certainty
to a variety of commercial transactions. 'Both the transactions in need of
clarification and the legal rules applicable to those transactions were taken
as given. The drafters' task was to clear away the judicial and statutory
precedent which cast a cloud of uncertainty over well established modes of
doing business. In some cases the application of pre-Code rules was uneven,
with consequent uncertainty in legal result. In others, different bodies of law
could apply to one transaction, again with uncertainty of result. For exam-
ple, article 2, "Sales," sought to disembowel the notion of "title," a concept
more conclusory than evidentiary and one which had little efficacy as a factor
in determining the outcome of disputes between buyer and seller.17 The
term title remains, but now is merely a vestigial remnant of the law of buyer
and seller.' 8 In place of title, article 2 lists a variety of operative facts, albeit
16. As Professor Gilmore has explained, a general codifying principle of the article
9 provisions was "whatever is[,] is right .... " 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 12.7, at 388 (1965). Professor Gilmore was overstating the
case for purposes of emphasis, but the point of his assertion remains true: the foremost
principle of the Uniform Commercial Code was to make more certain the legal environ-
ment of existing business practices.
17. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-101, Comment 1, states in part:
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale and
the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are stated as fol-
lowing directly from the contract and action taken under it without resorting
to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the deter-
mining factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between prac-
tical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of
which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions
proof of words and actions of a tangible character.
18. See UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401, Comment 1.
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generalized, which are to be applied to particular types of disputes in sales
transactions. Article 9, "Secured Transactions," justly celebrated as the most
ambitious of the articles, molded a body of secured transactions out of a vari-
ety of preexisting statutory and common law principles which were known to
Code insiders as the independent security devices. Article 9 rests one leg
on a uniform security device and the other on the type of collateral taken
by the secured party in order to cover the variety of transactions and settings
with which it must deal.19 The objective was to root out the possibility of
conflicting views of the same transactions. Prior to the Code, good faith
compliance with one statutory scheme, such as the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act,20 could result in an invalid security interest if a court viewed the trans-
action as creating a chattel mortgage, which entailed different formal requi-
sites as a condition to validity against competing interests in the same collat-
eral. 21 The other six substantive articles, although less dramatic in their re-
formulation of existing law, similarly sought to introduce certainty within a
defined field of commercial transactions. It is clear in some cases that the
Code has removed a good deal of uncertainty in prior law which served no
apparent purpose. Similarly, the recent 1972 amendments show that the
draftsmen are capable of continuing that task. There is now still greater cer-
tainty in some areas which had been left vague under the 1962 Code. For
example, the 1962 Code did not deal effectively with the problem of debtors
who change their names and subsequently acquire secured financing. The
later secured party found the existing notice filing scheme unhelpful, but the
1972 amendments have improved the situation.22
Thus, the codification effort of the UCC may be viewed as essentially an
effort to remove uncertainty in the eight areas which are the subjects of sub-
stantive articles under the Code. Indeed, in the decade or so of campaigning
for adoption engaged in by the draftsmen, their central theme was simplicity,
certainty and conformity to existing business practices. 23 It is quite a leap,
however, from the pursuit of those goals to the conclusion that the Code
has actually achieved them.
There has been a good deal of condensation and clarification under the
Code. Perhaps one unintended result of this legal fastidiousness is that these
19. This approach, which emphasizes the narrow question of classification of collat-
eral rather than the broader business setting, is troublesome although relatively neat.
See Ege, An Essay on Real and Personal Property, Or, Fixtures Unmasked, 7 VALPAR-
Aiso U.L. REV. 345, 356-58 (1973).
20. Superseded by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 9.
21. 1 G. GILMORE, SEcUarry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.3 (1965).
22. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402 (1972 Amendments).
23. Coogan, The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under the Code, 60
MICH. L. REV. 685 (1962).
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clear and certain commercial transactions have had quite definite and per-
ceptible social effects. Thus, holders in due course, standing behind the wall
of negotiability, could extract sums from seemingly hapless buyers of shoddy
goods. Clear and certain secured transactions could result in excessive use
of foreclosure proceedings. As the UCC showed that business practices were
amenable to conception, definition and codification in comprehensive fash-
ion, so it showed that business practices were now permissible under a spe-
cific, identifiable legal rule rather than by virtue of a complex and elusive
patchwork of statutes and case law.
The very clarity and certainty provided by the UCC at least plausibly ac-
counts in part for the outbreak of business reform legislation in the 1960's.
One of the most obvious progeny is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.24
Others are the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 25 and the later Fair
Credit Billing Act.26 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission sought and
ultimately obtained warranty disclosure legislation for use in consumer sales
transactions, 27 and the Commission has recently promulgated its holder-in-
due course rules.2
8
The Code effort of the late forties and early fifties and the more recent
legislative and administrative commercial reforms have implications for the
development of a law of electronic funds transfer systems. There no longer
seems to be any compelling case for prolonging uncertainty over liability for
such problems as delay, mistake and unauthorized use. The task for the
Code draftsmen is a familiar one: based on business practices they must clar-
ify the legal relationships involved when the new systems and procedures are
used for money transactions. The rules of articles 3 and 4, which to a sig-
nificant extent constitute the law of paper handling, check collection, and set-
tlement procedures, are not well suited to the new EFT transactions. Thus,
as in pre-Code days, legal rights are now in a state of uncertainty.
Two factors counsel delay, however, in fashioning rules to provide certainty
of legal outcome. First, we must recognize that the systems and procedures
for electronic funds transfer services are not well established business prac-
tices. Only a relatively few financial institutions are presently testing pro-
cedures, systems and services in an attempt to seek market hegemony. No
model transaction or clear set of business relationships similar to those in
24. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (as revised, 1974).
25. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 15,
18 U.S.C.).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1975).
27. Consumer Products Warranties, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (Supp. V, 1975).
28. '16 C.F.R. § 433 (1976).
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check payment transactions exists. Thus it would seem wise to await further
development of these services before proceeding to draft legislation to govern
these transactions even with the limited objective of providing certainty. A
premature draft could well be based upon business transactions which might
later evolve into quite different forms. An early draft could also create legal
impediments to a desired evolution of money transactions. To look ahead,
employees may insist on continuous payment in preference to the present sys-
tem under which they essentially finance their employers for periods of one
to four weeks. In theory, employees' accounts in an electronic environment
could be continuously credited with wages or salaries. The new technology
could provide horizons of service undreamed of, going far beyond mere re-
placement of the paper check.
A second factor counsels delay in producing a code of electronic funds
transfer transactions. It should not be assumed that a limited group of
draftsmen can develop an analytical structure for a code of electronic money
transactions. Certainly the draftsmen of the UCC did not undertake to act
alone. The comments are replete with references to case law analysis of the
legal structure of the transactions addressed, and the Code language built as
well upon preexisting uniform and tested statutory formulations. 29 Addition-
ally, the drafters had available to them a substantial body of commentary
and analysis on commercial law problems, as well as the benefit of uncounted
hours of discussion in law school classrooms. There is no comparable wealth
of knowledge to draw upon in the field of electronic funds transfers. The
assumption that we have closely analogous transactions upon which to base
new rules may prove misplaced if the new systems and procedures reconstruct
our conception of money and money services. This they seem likely to do.
There is, moreover, another major dimension to the search for a commer-
cial law for these new systems. It derives from the more recent commercial
law reform efforts which indicate that certainty of result in a defined commer-
cial transactions field is not enough. Goals for the EFT codification effort
may be in need of redefinition, and, as a result of that redefinition, the poli-
cies and purposes of the new statute may be far more complex and diverse.
29. Examples are: the studied rejection of "title" as a determinant of outcomes in
sales transactions, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-101, Comment 1; the rejection of
the "mirror image" rule articulated in UCC § 2-207; the perhaps overly refined or ill-
defined threefold approach to warranty liability contained in UCC §§ 2-313, 2-314 and
2-315; the extensive flexibility for a law of commercial specialties contained in part I
of article 3 concerning formal requisites of negotiability; the modification of Price v.
Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762), contained in UCC § 3-418; and the extensive reworking of
legal structures contained in article 9, as documented by Professor Gilmore. G. GIL-
MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
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The results, to the extent possible, must also be right. Thus, EFT law, in an
era of more critical examination of commercial law rules, may well assume a
broader policy role.
The search for policy leads to other areas of legal consideration, areas
which have heretofore been viewed as divorced from the rulemaking function
of commercial law statutes. Various institutions may demand that EFT com-
mercial law guarantee them the opportunity to participate, making it unlikely
that an EFT law could be limited solely to banks or even to depository insti-
tutions. At the same time, federal policy will require a mix of cooperative
and competitive development of EFT services; changes in technology and
proposed procedures will be measured against their effect on further com-
petitive development of the systems. Regulatory agencies of financial insti-
tutions will have an interest in the safety and soundness of EFT practices
which develop. Finally, users will have an interest in full disclosure of the
costs and benefits of using these new systems. Many consumers,
for example, are concerned over the loss of a paper writing which is evidence
of payment. Although the UCC nowhere explicitly requires that checks be
returned to customers, it does contain a provision which, in effect, requires
consumers to examine their bank statements for accuracy. 30 Should this sys-
tem of returned pieces of paper be abandoned in the EFT environment, or
should an EFT commercial law system require, either explicitly or effectively,
that a system of paper receipts be developed? Is it the proper province of
an EFT codification to impose this kind of physical requirement? There are
other instances where existing payment law policy may require reexamina-
tion.31
Existing check processing procedures also have certain implicit privacy
dimensions. A check payment, unlike payment through a terminal, poses
little threat of disclosure of bank balances. The amount of the purchase is
simply inscribed on the check when it is taken in payment. Moreover, while
banks may microfilm every check written, although they are not strictly re-
30. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406. As if to illustrate and underline the
framework of articles 3 and 4 as a law of commercial specialties, UCC § 3-307(1) es-
tablishes that each signature on an instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in
pleadings.
31. For example, the seldom-used stop payment power, which adds to the delays in
processing check payments, is viewed as an essential consumer protection device. It first
received uniform statutory treatment in the Code; there was no antecedent in the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law. Interestingly, the operating rules for automated
clearing houses provide an analogous rescission power for payment transactions proc-
essed through ACH clearing and routing procedures. See, e.g., National Automated
Clearing House Association Rules, Rule VIIi(A) at 19 (effective Jan. 1, 1977).
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quired to do so by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,32 the information contained
on the check, such as the identity of the payee, is difficult to retrieve since
indexing is done primarily by account number. 'Electronic funds transfer
transactions may be indexed in a variety of ways with a consequent increase
in the availability of information packaged in the payment, deposit or with-
drawal transaction. The Code, of course, only peripherally touches on these
matters.
Establishing a law of electronic funds transfers will be perplexing. In-
deed, it will be difficult even to isolate and define a proper field for legislative
attention. To assume that electronic funds transfer transactions are essen-
tially a subject for old style commercial law treatment reveals two errors:
one a pragmatic assessment and the other a matter of insight.
It is an error to assume that even present treatment of commercial law
subjects is the province solely of a commercial code. The recent overlay of
federal statutory and regulatory restrictions in such existing fields as sales
warranties and holder-in-due course protections in negotiable instrument
transactions shows that commercial transactions have already been redefined,
although not in a single statutory formulation. If these recent developments
are any indication, it is also an error to assume that the new technolo-
gies for money services may exist pristine in the setting of commercial law
certainty. Forces well underway will not countenance such a result and will
require consideration of consumer issues whether or not they are part of a
single statutory effort.
Yet there is a distinctly pragmatic assessment in the view that one must,
after all, begin somewhere to develop a statutory framework for the new
money services. That framework may as well begin, on the basis of estab-
lished, if numerically limited, transactional patterns to provide a framework
of certainty of contractual structures. Indeed, the great lesson that the Uni-
form Commercial Code has taught, and an insight which it has given us, is
that certainty must accompany policymaking. It must not, however, over-
shadow it. Thus, in structuring a law for electronic funds transfer transac-
tions, taking the lead of the UCC, we should insist upon clarity, certainty
and simplicity in the formulation of our policies.
32. Pub. L No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 12,
31 U.S.C.).
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